AGRARIAN REFORM
Brazil's Commitment

V- THE LANDLESS: WHO AND HOW MANY ARE THEY?

5.1 The Price
5.2 The Social Movements
5.3 The Conflicts
5.4 The Land Settlements
5.5 The Availability of Land
5.6 Value and Ownership Concentration

How many landless families are there in Brazil?

The available estimates vary greatly. According to some social organizations, there might be as many as 4.8 million landless families. On the other hand, the National Plan for Agrarian Reform (Programa Nacional de Reforma Agrária - PNRA), written in 1985 by 100 academics, estimated the number of potential beneficiaries at six to seven million families, including squatters, renters, sharecroppers, rural salaried employees, and small landowners. Based on these numbers, the PNRA established the goal of resettling 1.4 million families by 1989. It resettled 90,000. In turn, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), an organ of the United Nations, estimates that there are 2.5 million who would benefit from agrarian reform in Brazil.

Based on the Farm Census of 1985, it is known that nearly five million workers earn some type of remuneration in the countryside, and 56% of them are temporary salaried workers. In general, they live in the cities and work in the countryside; their employment is uncertain and varies according to the harvest cycle and the demand for labor. They are the migrant workers (bóias-frias).

The remaining 44% of the workers are permanent salaried employees, rural laborers with a fixed place of employment. In general, they are more qualified: tractor operators and foremen in agriculture, and cowboys and inseminators in cattle farming. In addition to these, another 470,000 are rural workers classified as sharecroppers who are paid in kind, i.e., a percentage of the crop. Taken together, these categories of rural workers number almost 5.5 million people.

In the southern, southeastern and part of the central-west regions of Brazil, the capital structure in the countryside is advanced, the agriculture is modern, and farm production is managed by true rural companies that incorporate high levels of mechanization and technology. In these regions, the workers' basic concerns are typical of the capitalist labor market: better salaries and working conditions, respectable retirement, transportation, health, controlled use of pesticides, etc. For the majority of these workers, these demands are more relevant than the struggle for land.

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5.1 The Price

How much does society pay for the resettlement of one landless family?

These estimates vary also. The government estimates the cost to resettle one family to be around R$ 40,000. In some regions of the country's central-south, where land is more expensive, this sum could be the amount paid just for the plot of land. However, the average cost of the land for a resettled family is R$ 20,000.

There are other costs. Upon receiving its plot of land, each family receives a credit of R$340 for food. Then it obtains a R$ 740 development credit, a totalling R$ 1,080 as establishment credit, and a R$2,000 credit for construction of a house.

The next step is to register with the Special Credit Program for Agrarian Reform (Programa de Crédito Especial para a Reforma Agrária - PROCERA), which provides access to three lines of financing: an expense credit -- R$1,000; an investment credit -- R$7,500; and a cooperative credit -- R$ 7,500, for the family to pay for its quota to the settlement's cooperative (see table below).

The government provides half of these resources as a grant -- the family does not have to repay them. The family has to repay the other half over seven years, with a two-year grace period. The family has to reimburse the government for half the R$ 1,000 expense credit in one year. In practice, however, the family does not always pay. Nevertheless, if it does pay, it earns the right to receive a new credit of more than R$ 1,000, with the same repayment conditions.

TABLE 15

In summary, the goal to resettle 100,000 families in 1998 represents an outlay on the order of R$ 4 billion.

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5.2 The Social Movements

Two rural worker organizations stand out among the social movements that are fighting to democratize access to land and to improve working conditions and salaries in the countryside: the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura - CONTAG) and the Landless Workers Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Terra - MST).

Older and larger, the CONTAG is organized throughout the country. It has five million members, organized into 3,200 unions and 24 state federations. Both the CONTAG and the MST support officials elected by various political parties, including those that make up the government's support base in the National Congress and in the state legislatures.

The MST started in the state of Rio Grande do Sul at the beginning of the 1980s, during the period of military rule, as the result of a coordinated effort to occupy idle lands. These occupations, by rural workers who called themselves landless, multiplied and spread to other states. This was the origin of the movement, which came into formal existence in 1985, when it held its first national congress.

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5.3 The Conflicts

The majority of land conflicts in Brazil originate in the absence of legal titles and of boundary markings on lands that are already occupied. Those who are most vulnerable to violence are the small squatters (posseiros). In Brazil, there are more than one million squatters, the vast majority of whom are small farmers. They are not landowners, but live and work either on large private farms that are little used by their owners or on vacant pubic lands.

The small squatters are constant victims of land-grabbers (grileiros), who frequently drive out the former, who in turn occupy Indian lands, creating a tense situation. That is why, in areas of recent occupations, the most important measure taken to reduce violence is not the expropriation of land, but rather the granting of legal titles to protect the legitimate squatters from the land-grabbers.

In the last few years, two regions have become renowned because of their potential for violent conflicts: the Pontal do Paranapanema in the far-west of the state of São Paulo, bordering the states of Paraná and Mato Grosso do Sul; and the state of Pará, in northern Brazil -- an area twice the size of France and with 80% of its territory covered by the Amazon rainforest.

In Pontal do Paranapanema, the conflicts originate in the lack of land titles. Since the time when the large landholders colonized the region at the beginning of the century, there has not been a satisfactory definition of the legal status of the property. The state government does not recognize the legitimacy of the documents of the farms located in this area, considering the lands to be vacant and, therefore, public.

Every attempt made by successive state governments to resolve the problem has failed due to political pressures, budgetary difficulties and the slow progress of the lawsuits in the justice system. The federal government has transferred R$30 million to the São Paulo state government to pay for the improvements on the unoccupied lands that are being prepared for agrarian reform. In 1996, the government resettled 1,900 families in Pontal do Paranapanema.

In Pará, the property situation is chaotic: there are immense unused and undocumented farms; widespread land-grabbing, including on Indian lands; and prospectors and clandestine woodcutters, principally of mahogany.

Moreover, there have been no adequate alternatives for resettling families displaced by large farming projects and by the construction of hydroelectric dams like Tucuruí.

Today, the country is paying the price for past mistakes that have transformed part of Pará into a permanent area of conflict. To confront the problem, the Special Ministry of Landed Property Policy created a new superintendency within INCRA, in the city of Marabá. Thus, Pará has become the only state to have two superintendencies -- one in the capital, Belém, and the other in the interior.

The government is determined to intensify the agrarian reform measures in the region. In 1996, the government resettled 10,000 families in Pará -- one-sixth of the 60,000 families resettled in all of the country.

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5.4 The Land Settlements

Last year, the majority of agrarian reform actions concentrated on areas where violent conflicts threatened the lives of workers. Thus, of the 62,044 families resettled in 1996, 45,471 were in areas of conflict where quarrels had been resolved and land possession legalized.

Of the families resettled in areas of conflict, 27,453 were squatters and 18,018 were from encampments (acampados) -- the latter being groups of landless people who stay on or around a rural property, along the roadsides, in temporary and precarious conditions. Nevertheless, they are organized and live collectively. The government resettled another 16,573 families in areas that were free of conflicts.

GRAPHIC 2

In achieving its goals for 1996, the government sought to respond to the demands of the principal social organizations defending landownership. Thus, of the 226 areas that the CONTAG proposed for agrarian reform, 28 were non-viable and, of the remaining 198, the government expropriated or acquired 100. For its part, the MST proposed 196 areas: the government determined that 15 were non-viable for agrarian reform, and it expropriated or bought 126 of the remaining 181.

Last year, the government expropriated a total of 575 rural properties -- an increase of 180% over 1995 (205 expropriated properties). Land acquisition also increased: in 1995, the government bought 24 rural properties and, last year, 38. Thus, in two years, the government expropriated 780 properties and bought another 62.

The number of agrarian reform projects created in 1996 grew significantly: 435 compared with 310 in 1995. This gives a total of 745 new projects in two years that allowed the resettlement of 74,952 families: 32,710 in 1995 and 42,242 last year. In implementing the older agrarian reform programs, the government resettled 19,802 families last year and 10,202 in 1995 (see the following table).

TABLE 16

The government has also sought to respond to the demands of the social organizations in its selection of families for resettlement. An analysis of last year's resettlements indicates that, of the 62,044 families resettled, 11,406 were part of the MST, 36,585 had ties to the CONTAG, and 3,684 belonged to other social movements, such as the Struggle for Land Movement (Movimento de Luta pela Terra - MLT), and the Pastoral Land Commission (Comissão Pastoral da Terra - CPT), an entity of the Catholic Church with ties to the National Conference of the Bishops of Brazil (Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil - CNBB). The other 10,369 families resettled in 1996 had no ties to a social movement (see graph).

GRAPHIC 3

The most dramatic situation is that of the encamped families, given the terrible conditions in which they live. The government is committed to giving these families priority for resettlement.

In 1995, there were about 29,034 encamped families registered by INCRA, of which 6,993 had been resettled -- corresponding to 24% of the encamped families and 16.3% of that year's resettlements -- leaving an additional 22,041 families. In 1996, in addition to the number not settled the prior year, another 21,111 families surfaced, resulting in a total of 43,152 encamped families. Of these, the government resettled 18,018 families -- 41% of the encamped families and 29% of what was accomplished in 1996, leaving 25,371 families for 1997 (see graph).

GRAPHIC 4

These data lead to three conclusions:

  1. In 1996, there was a 257.6% increase in the resettlement of encamped families compared with 1995, even taking into account a 48% increase in the total number of encamped families from one year to the next.
  2. Even so, 1997 began with 15% more encamped families -- 25,371 -- compared with how many there were at the end of 1995 -- 22,041. This in spite of the government having resettled, during those two years, 25,011 encamped families. Thus, the number of encamped families in 1997 is almost equal to that which the government resettled over the past two years. If this trend continues, we will never see an end to the process: the more we resettle, the more there will be to resettle.
  3. By implementing an effective resettlement policy for encamped families, the government is feeding the expectations of a growing number of people, possibly unemployed, who have no relation to the countryside. They go to the encampments hoping to receive a tract of land. Therefore, the very solution is creating new demands.

In January 1997, the data on the evolution of the encampments were as follows:

- encamped and registered families in 1995

29,034

- encamped families resettled in 1995

6,993

- remaining encamped families in 1995

22,041

- encamped and registered families in 1996

43,152

- encamped families resettled in 1996

18,018

- remaining encamped families in 1996

25,134

- encamped and registered families in January 1997

25,371

- of these, those tied to the MST

20,297

- those tied to the CONTAG and other movements

5,074

The encampments of landless families are concentrated principally in four states: Paraná, Mato Grosso do Sul, Goiás and Pernambuco. Sixty percent of the encamped families, i.e., 14,621, are found in these four states. The state of Paraná alone contains 26% of all these families. The encampment on just one farm has 2,900 families, or 44.6% of the total registered in Paraná. The following is the distribution, by region, of the encamped populations.

TABLE 17

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5.5 The Availability of Land

The federal government began 1997 with enough expropriated land to resettle 40,000 families -- half of the goal for this year, which is to resettle 80,000 families.

Data collected in the INCRA land registration of 1992 indicate that 150 million hectares of rural land, located on approximately 55,000 properties, are classified as large and unproductive. This is an expanse of land three times the size of France.

Nevertheless, 70% of this area -- or almost 100 million hectares -- is located in the northern and central-west regions of the country, largely in dense and unhealthy forests without roads, transport systems, energy or communications. Another 25 million hectares are located in the northeast, largely in the hinterland, with little water and poor soil (see the following graphs).

GRAPHIC 5

Taking into consideration that these territories cannot be occupied in the short term, the supply of lands that are suitable for the immediate implementation of viable agrarian reform projects will be substantially smaller than those 150 million hectares. Even so, it constitutes an area of 25 million hectares -- roughly the same size as Portugal, Switzerland, Belgium and Hungary combined.

This number is quite close to that reported in the IBGE's 1985 farm census -- 24.5 million hectares of unused productive land in the country.

According to the IBGE definition, 56% of these unused lands belong to rural properties of less than 1,000 hectares. Moreover, the farms are not always entirely unproductive, but rather have unused parcels of land within the properties. This situation puts into question the expropriation of the entire properties for agrarian reform purposes.

It is true, however, that there are considerable unoccupied federal and state lands, principally in the frontier regions, that are being considered as part of Brazil's landed property restructuring process. The army has even offered part of the lands under its jurisdiction for rural resettlement programs.

However, the unoccupied lands, because of their large size -- together they measure almost seven million hectares, or twice the size of Belgium -- need to be parceled differently than has been done traditionally. These special projects need to give priority attention to the commercialization and the local processing of farm production.

Clearly, it is still a priority to define the lands available for resettlement; their geographic location; and their social, production and commercial infrastructures. In 1997, the IBGE should report the results of its 1996 farm census, thereby providing more current data.

In conclusion, though enough land is available to accomplish the agrarian reform objectives, there certainly are not 150 million hectares ready for the resettlement of millions of landless families, if the government would only expropriate them.

Finally, one should consider the limits imposed by ecological concerns and by the problem of Indian lands. Society and government share responsibility for guaranteeing the preservation of Indian lands. Until a few years ago, agricultural expansion and irresponsible land redistribution were threats to the survival of the Indian populations, which today are protected by the accelerated demarcation of their territories.

Similarly, the national expropriation and resettlement projects must be compatible with the preservation of the Amazon forest, the Mata Atlântica forests, the savannas of the Central Plateau, the Mato Grosso Pantanal, and other ecosystems.

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5.6 Value and Ownership Concentration

Brazil's perverse concentration of landownership is demonstrated in the following table:

TABLE 18

We can gauge landownership concentration also by the growth, in absolute numbers, of large rural properties. The official real estate census of 1966 identified 41,000 properties with an area of 1,000 hectares or more, occupying a total of 139 million hectares. In 1978, there were 57,000 properties of this size, totaling 246 million hectares -- a 77% increase in territory occupied by large properties. The 1992 census listed a total of 43,000 properties, totaling 165 million hectares.

In general, the land structure remained virtually unchanged: less than 2% of all registered properties, represented by the segment of large properties of 1,000 or more hectares, continue to control more than 50% of all registered land.

During the last three decades, a series of factors have fostered speculative investment in land as a store of value. Many financial agents, with no ties to farm production, have added large landholdings to their portfolio.

Among these factors, the following stand out: a) a source of prestige and power -- in many regions of the country, control of land still translates into control of votes; b) economic instability and inflation make land, the value of which stays ahead of inflation, a safe investment; c) legitimization of earnings that are of questionable origin, since tax legislation on agricultural property and income is flexible and generous; d) the Rural Land Tax is largely symbolic; e) income tax evasion; and f) access to subsidized credit.

The current government has taken a series of measures to eliminate some of these factors:

  1. Implemented a successful economic plan that brought down chronic inflation from 80% per month to 10% per year, in 1996, and to less than 1% per month in the first two months of 1997, and assured economic stability;
  2. Radically changed the Rural Land Tax, as explained later;
  3. Expropriated unproductive lands on a large-scale for the purpose of agrarian reform;
  4. Improved income tax collection procedures;
  5. Terminated the generalized subsidies and the subsidized rural credits; and
  6. Inserted Brazil into the competitive world market and increased the country's economic openness, which forced large property owners to sell part of their lands in order to invest and to improve the efficiency and productivity of the lands they retained. The same thing is happening with banks and large corporations that have held extensive land areas solely as a store of value and as a means of safeguarding their assets. They are now selling the land to invest in the modernization of their principal business activity.

Over the last two years, these sales have resulted in one of the largest crises that the Brazilian real estate market has ever faced. The average price of land has plummeted and there is an almost total lack of liquidity. These are two sides of the same coin: if it is bad for the unproductive landowners, it is good for the agrarian reform process. Never before in Brazil has there been so much land for sale at such a low price.

According to data collected by the Fundação Getúlio Vargas' Center for Agricultural Studies, a hectare that cost R$4,170 in June 1986, was valued at R$1,350 in June 1996. In the state of São Paulo, where the most expensive land in the country is located, the price of a hectare in June 1996 was 35% less than in it was in June 1994, when the government introduced the currency stabilizing Real Plan.

In Minas Gerais, also a region of expensive land, more than 5,000 farms that are considered unproductive are for sale, which is equal to almost the entire amount of the state's unused land. The price of productive lands, on the other hand, has increased. In the Triângulo Mineiro region, one of the most prosperous in Brazil, the price of an alqueire (4.84 hectares) has increased from an average of R$2,900 to R$4,800. The practice of large-scale leasing -- a unique agrarian reform experiment that was carried out in the region and that will be analyzed later -- also is responsible for the appreciation of land values.

In the state of Rio Grande do Sul, which is a large producer of meat and grains and has the most even distribution of landownership in Brazil, land prices have fallen also -- between 30% and 50%, depending on the region. Properties that were selling for R$ 2,000 per hectare are now going for as little as R$ 800.

The profound transformation and reform through which Brazil is passing will eventually cause landownership to lose its speculative character. Land will stop functioning as a store of value and will fulfill its social and economic function, creating a more equal society.

GRAPHIC 6

 

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VI- SMALL PROPERTY AND OTHER INITIATIVES